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"Learning to Govern": The Texas 
Experience 
Tiffany Barnes & Timothy J. O'Neill 
Southwestern Univers ity 
The Republican Party took control of the Texas House 
of Representatives for the first time in 130 yea rs on 
Januar y 14 , 2003. How did the Texas House change as 
the Republicans learned how to be the majority party 
and the Democrats struggled with being the minority ? 
The Texas House 's painful shift from a partially bipar-
tisan to a fully partisan chamber was not only the 
product of inexperienced Leadership and harsh partisan 
bullying. The changes were Largely the product of a 
broader pro cess of electoral calculation and co nse -
quent deinstitutionalization affecting man y other state 
l eg islatures that have not ex peri ence d recent shifts in 
party control. 
On January 14, 2003, the first Republican majority in 130 years took control of the Texas House of Representa-tives. How did the Texas House change as the Republi-
can Party assumed the role of the majority party and the Democ-
rats the role of the minority party? For the previous twenty years 
the Texas House operated as a partially bipartisan rather than a 
partisan legislature, unlike the modem U.S. House of Represen -
tatives. Did the Texas House continue the tradition under new 
management, or did it become increasingly partisan? Why? In 
brief, what were the significant changes and continuities in the 
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Texas House as the parties switched their roles? 
Our thesis is that, while the Texas House did suffer from in-
experienced leadership and harsh partisan bullying, the changes 
in the House were part of a broader pattern of electoral calcula-
tion and consequent deinstitutionalization affecting many other 
state legislatures that have not experienced recent shifts in party 
control. We studied the 2003 regular session (January through 
June) of the Texas House and explored the impact of electoral 
calculations and party agendas on how fundamental norms, pro-
cedures, and rules changed and how the two parties operated 
within these changes. In particular, we examine rule and norm 
changes dealing with seniority, motions to amend, the House 
Speaker's powers, points of order, calls for recorded floor votes, 
and the use of quorum calls. Our article tests three explanations 
for the increase in partisanship and incivility during this session: 
the "Fenno" explanation that stresses leadership inexperience, 
the "DeLay" explanation that blames U.S. House Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay's intrusions into the Texas House's delibera-
tions, and the "deinstitutionalization" explanation that empha-
sizes the paramountcy of external over institutional goals and 
demands (Rosenthal, 1996a). 
Approach 
We employ qualitative measures of changes in key norms, 
rules and procedures using a combination of participant-
observation and elite interviews. Telephone interviews conducted 
in 2004 supplement this data. We did not use conventional voting 
analyses because the Texas House does not record floor votes 
unless there is an appeal from the members. Since partisan or 
electoral motives prompt such appeals, they do not present a rep-
resentative sample of voting on the House floor. 
Interviews were conducted with thirty-one individuals during 
the 2003 regular session. Seventeen were members of the 2003 
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House of Representatives , 12 Republicans and 5 Democrats . 
Seven were staff members in House offices or the House itself. 
Seven were either directors of advocacy groups or journalists. 
Additional interviews were conducted in 2004 with 19 mem-
bers of the House (14 Democrats, 5 Republicans). Democrat and 
minority representatives were over-sampled to offset the poten-
tial bias of the original 2003 pool. Results from the 2004 inter-
views are used to test statements and assertions made by the 
original interviewees, especially those relating to the data col-
lected in Tables 2-5. However, since respondents' views may 
have been tainted by the partisan battles over congressional re-
districting that consumed much of the summer sessions, the 2004 
responses are not merged with the responses gathered during the 
2003 regular session. While the 2004 responses largely confirm 
views of the 2003 cohort, significant differences are analyzed 
below. 
We used a semi-structured interviewing protocol. All respon -
dents were asked questions and appropriate follow-up prompts 
from a standard list. They were encouraged to discuss topics and 
to make observations beyond those listed in our protocol. The 
protocol was pre-tested in a small number of initial interviews 
and then refined before being applied to the interviews discussed 
here. / 
Our analysis relies upon these interviews, supplemented by 
news accounts about, and our own observations of, the session. 
Opinions expressed that were not supported by news accounts or 
participant observations are not used as evidence. The elimina-
tion of such opinions, along with nonresponsive comments on 
some questions, explains the differing number of responses in 
our Tables. 
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Fenno Versus DeLay: The Conventional Explanations 
The Texas House's problems during its regular session could 
be explained by two, not wholly contradictory, explanations. The 
"Fenno" explanation builds upon Richard Fenno's argument that 
four decades of being out of power left U.S. House Republicans 
without the experience they needed to properly interpret their 
electoral victory or govern the country once they became the ma-
jority in 1995. The "Tom DeLay Did It" explanation stressed the 
division caused by U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay 
pressuring Texas House Speaker Tom Craddick to ram a con-
gressional redistricting plan through the 2003 regular session. 
Both explanations purport to explain the rise in friction, decline 
in civility, and the breakdown of bipartisan norms in the Texas 
House. 
The 1995 Republican majority in the U.S. House was able to 
pass some of its "Contract with America," the campaign prom-
ises that may have helped Republicans win an upset election in 
1994, but the House leadership failed to exploit the natural ad-
vantages of being a new party in power. They could not avoid the 
1995 government shutdown that weakened the new Republican 
majority while strengthening their Democratic opponent, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton . Fenno (1997, 2) explains the Republicans' 
failures in terms of the lack of institutional leadership skills. An 
extended duration of one-party control produces consequences 
once there is a change in party control: confrontational leader-
ship behavior, deterioration in cross party civility, and decline in 
public confidence of legislatures as an institution. 
Members of the minority party must decide how to adapt to 
their new place in the House. Fenno (1997, 13) recognizes two 
strategies for adapting to the role of the minority. He identifies 
the first as "institutional partisans" who try to accommodate the 
majority by working within the rules in an attempt to influence 
the agenda. The second are the "confrontational partisans" who 
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attempt Lo oppose any legislation proposed by the majority with 
the goal of driving the majority from power . 
Fenno's solution to these problems is regular exchange of 
party control. There are two crucial features, claims Fenno 
(1997, 9), of a majority-minority relationship: the majority party 
organizes and runs the House and the minority party adapts to 
the governing majority. When both parties alternate being in the 
majority and having power, they are more likely to consult, co-
operate and compromise with the other party. A sense of recip-
rocity develops. Moreover, the expertise the new majority needs 
to govern the House can only be gained through "trial and error 
of those who have held power" (Fenno, 1997, l 6-18, 20). This 
relationship does not develop when one party is in the majority 
for an extended duration of time and does not foresee becoming 
the minority. 
In 1998 the Republican takeover of the Florida state legisla-
ture confronted a similar challenge. Tom Feeney, the speaker of 
Florida's House, sent a cautionary message in 2002 to the Re-
publican majority in the Texas House. "I became convinced that 
voters really didn't want a conservative revolution. They wanted 
a conservative evolution." He concludes by warning, "You have 
got to be for change and that change has to be conservative 
change." 1 
The Fenno explanation would argue that the Texas House Re-
publicans' inexperience, their lack of training as legislative, 
committee, and institutional leaders, caused the breakdown of 
rules and norms in the Texas House . If only the Texas House Re-
publicans had interpreted their victory differently and had more 
experience in governing, then they would have approached their 
agenda with more prudence and made fewer mistakes. 
1 Herman (2002. A I). See also Jewett (2002). 
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There are several problems with applying the Fenno explana-
tion to the difficulties experienced in the 2003 Texas House. 
Unlike the increasingly partisan U.S. House in the 1980s and 
1990s, the Texas House underwent a shift to a more bipartisan 
status during this period. Moreover, while the Republican major-
ity did stumble in its efforts to manage the House, the Democrat 
minority's problems were at least as crucial to the breakdown of 
bipartisanship in the 2003 regular session. 
The Texas House of Representatives has been a partially bi-
partisan legislature since the early l 980s.2 A fully bipartisan leg-
islature would create an agenda that entertains issues important 
to both parties, issues that generate support not specific to party 
ideologies only, and would share power among the parties pro-
portional to the number of seats each party holds. A partisan leg-
islature is one in which power and legislative success is sharply 
defined by partisan allegiances, with the majority party dominat-
ing both the structure and the agenda of the institution. 
The former Democratic majority did share some power with 
the old Republican minority. Republicans served as chairs and 
vice-chairs on legislative committees and some were members of 
the highest leadership circles. A loose coalition of conservative 
and moderate Democrats worked with Republican members to 
advance legislative agendas common to all. However, this bipar-
tisan relationship was not a complete one. Committee chairs 
were not distributed according to numeric proportions. Nonethe-
less, unlike the U.S. House Republican leadership, the senior 
Texas House Republicans were often experienced in chairing 
committees and in House rules, norms, and procedures. A few 
2 While this is a common perception shared by many legislators , observers, and scholars, 
not all agree. For example Representative Arlene Wohlgemuth (R-Burleson) character-
ized this era as "a disguised partisanship ." Interview with Representative Arlene Wohl-
gemuth, July JO, 2003 . For a brief history of the Texas House during the 1980s and early 
1990s, see Hamm and Harmel ( 1993). 
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first term Republicans were appointed to committee chairs. They 
did not have such expertise. 
Republican campaign promises were few, specific, and ex-
pressed fundamental principles of Texas populism-a distrust of 
government ("no new truces"), a distrust of some corporations 
and lawyers (home insurance and medical tort reform), and less 
broadly affirmed, sensitivity to the concerns of the pro-life 
movement. There was no radical agenda to remake Texas gov-
ernment corresponding to the 1994 Republican "Contract with 
America." 
The Texas Republicans seem to have learned the lesson 
taught by Newt Gingrich's problems, and reinforced by the ex-
perience of the Florida legislature: evolution, not revolution, 
was their goal. The senior Republican leaders were experienced, 
not novices, and the Republican freshmen generally followed the 
leadership. The Fenno explanation does not seem fully adequate 
to explain what happened in the Texas House. 
The "Tom Delay Did It" explanation has less scholarly war-
rant but is founded in a widespread, elite media assertion that 
inside Washington, D.C., "Beltway politics" afflicted the Texas 
House. Media accounts and pundits' columns saw the sinister 
hidden hand of Tom DeLay in the redistricting debacle that 
caused the House to grind to a halt on May 17 when 58 of the 62 
House Democrats refused to appear on the floor for a quorum 
call (Dubose and Reid, 2004). Allegedly, DeLay's bullying con-
tributed to the breakdown of bipartisan norms in the Texas 
House, causing not only a decline in civility but eventually a col-
lapse of the legislative process when most Democratic represen-
tatives refused to appear for the quorum call. 
While neither Congressman DeLay nor the Texas House 
leadership ever admitted to the key role he played in pushing 
redistricting, memos released on the eve of the court challenge to 
the congressional redistricting plan show that DeLay was the 
\'OL. 34 2006 
8 BARNES & O'NEILL 
principal force behind redistricting (Pasztor and Herman, 2003; 
Copelin, 2004). No doubt strong-arming and partisan bullying 
occurred. But the decline in civility and consensus-producing 
norms in the House began well before the push for redistricting. 
Media fixation on Tom DeLay's role may be more simply ex-
plained by public and media cynicism about any kind of power 
play on topics such as redistricting. Ronald Weber (I 999, 610) 
argues that because state legislators must make policy that di-
rectly affects their interests (redistricting, pay raises, rules gov-
erning lobbyists), "public confidence in the institution and 
individual members" is undermined and the media are encour-
aged to "highlight any alleged abuses of legislative life." 
While DeLay's actions may have helped to push the House 
down the slippery slope of partisan conflict, it was neither the 
sole nor primary factor. The penetration of electoral politics and 
competition into the House process, the resulting deinstitution-
alization of the Texas House, and the growing suspicion of each 
party by the other party can be explained by factors that seem to 
affect many contemporary state legislatures. The Texas House is 
not unique in suffering a breakdown in norms of civility and re-
ciprocity. In brief, "Tom" did not do it. Contemporary state legis-
lative politics did it. 
Although there were specific aspects of the members' conduct 
that are explained by Fenno's concerns about inexperienced 
leadership and DeLay's use of hardball tactics, the Texas House 
shared in the process of deinstitutionalization, increasing parti-
sanship, and the decline of civility common to many state legis-
latures over the past twenty years (Moncrief, Thompson, and 
Kurtz, 1996). 
The Alternative Explanation: Texas as the Norm 
The legislative process is based on antagonistic cooperation. 
Rules, norms, and procedures are pivotal factors in creating the 
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right kind of antagonistic cooperation. These factors create in-
centives and disincentives for the legislature's members, molding 
their behavior in predictable ways. Individual ambitions and 
goals, mediated by rules, procedures, norms, and committee and 
party organizations, impose some degree of stability on decision-
making. 
Rules are bargaining chips in the negotiations that get legisla-
tion through the legislature . They convey different sets of advan-
tages and disadvantages to different participants in the policy 
process . Rules also express what behaviors are acceptable and 
what goals are permissible. Rules help to mold outcomes by de-
termining what alternatives are allowed to be considered and 
voted on, thereby facilitating or impeding the success of the 
various players in the organization. Rules are explicit, but norms 
constitute the unwritten rules of the game, the shared understand-
ings that determine what is and is not acceptable behavior. 
While written rules and unwritten norms are important, fac-
tors external to the legislature such as elections also have pro-
found impact on the policy decisions made in a legislature. 
Indeed, it is the external factor of electoral pressure that is forc-
ing major changes in the internal workings of state legislatures. 
Alan Rosenthal (1996a, 190) observes that increasing party 
competition for state legislatures, accompanied by increasing 
partisan conflict within state legislatures, have shifted members' 
concerns away from the needs of the legislature as an institution 
to the specific electoral and policy objectives of their parties. 
This contributes, in Ronald Hedlund's (1984, 67) words, to the 
decline of legislative "norms regarding debate and member in-
teraction," producing "exchanges that are blunt and often threat-
ening." Joel Thompson and Gary Moncrief (1992, 196-7) also 
find that legislatures are exposed to increasing outside pressures 
to which they must adapt. Thus, legislatures' efforts to adapt cre-
ate increasing pressures within the legislatures. 
\'OL. 34 2006 
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The literature on state legislatures now widely recognizes that 
there is diminished institutionalization within state legislatures. 
"In the past few years," Rosenthal() 998, 72) observes, 
legislatures [are] becoming more permeable and more likely 
to have outside influences penetrate internal structures and 
processes. Indeed, the environment can no longer be kept 
outside of the legislature but has become, or is becoming, an 
integral part of life and business within the legislature. 
Rosenthal (1998, 173) concludes that 
Pressures from without [notably from the media and the pub-
lic] ... have succeeded in limiting terms and careers, in erod-
ing whatever normative system might have existed earlier, 
and in wrestling away legislative control from internal man-
agement. No longer can many state legislative bodies be 
characterized ... as an organization that displaces goals and 
focuses on internal processes at the expense of external de-
mands. No longer can it be said, if it ever could be said, that 
the state legislature is an end value itself rather than an in-
strument for pursuit of other values. 
This pattern of deinstitutionalization is found among state 
legislatures that have experienced recent changes in party control 
such as Florida, 11linois, and Minnesota, and in state legislatures 
that have no4 such as California, Massachusetts, Utah, and New 
Hampshire (Rosenthal, 1989; 1996b; 1998). In some cases, dein-
stitutionalization was abetted by causes in addition to electoral 
pressures and calculations. For example, Thompson, Kurtz, and 
Moncrief (1996) found that professionalization of legislators' 
staffs and longer career interests may contribute to deinstitution-
alization. But they also conclude that "politicization," a concept 
similar to our emphasis on electoral calculations and pressures, 
had an independent and powerful effect (Moncrief, Thompson, 
and Kurtz, 1996). This last finding is especially pertinent to the 
TIIE JOURNAL or POLITICAL SCIENCE 
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Texas House since it has undergone no appreciable profession-
alization over the last twenty years (Hamm and Harmel, 1993). 
In brief, many state legislatures are experiencing the phe-
nomenon of "deinstit utionalization ," where the notion of the in-
stitution as an end in itself is overshadowed by the demands of 
its environment and external demands replace internal goals 
(Ronsenthal, 1996a, 185, 194-5). This breakdown of the norms, 
values, and procedures that form the unseen walls separating an 
institution from its environment is near universal in state legisla-
tures. The change in the dynamics and goals of electoral calcula-
tions is one of the major factors prompting deinstitutionalization. 
The Impact of Electoral Calculations and Goals 
The Texas House in the 1980s and 1990s may have been an 
anomaly. Unlike other state legislatures that became more elec-
tion-oriented and experienced deinstitutionalization and growing 
partisanship, the Texas House became partially bipartisan during 
these two decades. Part of this had to do with the shifting bal-
ance within the House. As Republicans gained strength they 
formed a coalition with moderate and conservative Democrat s on 
issues that appealed to the center-right. George W. Bush's gover-
norships were times of strong personal connections between the 
Republican executive and the Democrat House Speaker, Pete 
Laney. The 1990s was also a period of sustained economic 
growth and rising tax revenues, permitting expansions of state 
budgets without forcing confrontations over who wins and loses. 
But all these factors disappeared by January 2003. 
Texas' financial crisis in 2003 sharpened the ideological and 
partisan polarization in the House. The Texas House confronted a 
difficult session in 2003 even without the change in party con-
trol. The state budget was almost ten billion dollars in deficit. 
The sluggish economy and rising unemployment placed greater 
demands on social services while lowering revenues. The school 
\'OL. 34 2006 
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finance system needed reform, especially property tax relief. 
Newly elected House Speaker Tom Craddick, the first Republi-
can speaker since 1873, characterized the hardships facing the 
House. 
We are facing billions of dollars in shortfall, the retirement 
of 16 committee chairs after the last session of the Legisla-
ture, and 76 percent of our House members having never 
served with a deficit. There will be a learning curve. 3 
Finally, the defeat or retirement of moderate and conservative 
Democrats and their replacement by conservative Republicans in 
recent years emptied the ideological center in the Texas House. 
The old coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats was 
gone, creating a more polarized House. 
The 2003 Texas House manifested the behavior of other state 
legislatures that have become more election-oriented. Comment-
ing on general trends in state legislatures, Alan Rosenthal (2002, 
6, 8) found that 
legislative campaign committees, under the direction of leg-
islative party leaders, are now the principal source of party 
assistance to legislative candidates in tough races .... Lead-
ers are more preoccupied with campaigns and elections. 
With campaigning infusing the process, civility is on the de-
cline. Because the environment has changed, socializing 
across party lines .. .is much diminished. 
Leadership roles have correspondingly shifted from facilitating 
the passage of legislation to becoming campaign finance provid-
ers and facilitators (Squire, 1992). 
The general literature stresses how electoral competition has 
reinforced policy and ideological differences, "crystallizing 
rather than resolving divergent partisan views. This trend may 
3 Quoted in Hennan (2003). 
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render deliberation and negotiation parts of the process less im-
portant, while the exploitation of issues for the purpose of parti-
san electoral gain becomes more important" (Squire, 1992, 192). 
The 2003 regular session reflected this trend. 
Part of the tension in the Texas House sprang from this grow-
ing emphasis on electoral outcomes. There were different views 
of how these changes affected the Texas House in 2003. It is 
clear that Tom Craddick was seeking to build a Republican ma-
jority in the Texas House. As a rising leader Craddick adopted an 
aggressive recruitment strategy. He and his close advisors, in 
concert with sympathetic business and policy groups, were key 
actors in recruiting, funding, and advising Republican opponents 
challenging Democrat incumbents or competing for open seats. 
Former House Speaker Pete Laney (D-Hale Center) ex-
plained, "We have never had members in the legislature cam-
paign against one another." Tom Craddick had been removed 
from Laney's leadership team not because he had campaigned 
against Laney. "He has always campaigned against me, and .. .I 
still gave him leadership positions. But when he started to defeat 
others is when I busted him."4 The fact that Craddick and other 
Republican members publicly supported Laney's opponent in the 
previous election no doubt also influenced Laney. Representative 
Mike Krusee (R-Round Rock) viewed things differently. Accord-
ing to him, Laney seemed to be saying, "Republicans are not 
allowed to seek a majority during the electoral session. They 
must be bipartisan during the session and the election." 5 
An essential component of both the Fenno and DeLay expla-
nations is the vulnerability of freshmen legislators to leadership 
pressures. Newt Gingrich had worked long and hard to recruit 
4 interview with Representative Pete Laney (D-Hale Center) , former Speaker of the Texas 
House of Representatives, July I, 2003. 
5 Interview with Representative Mike Krusee (R-Round Rock), June 23, 2003. 
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and fund Republican opponents to sitting U.S. House Democrats 
in the years before the 1994 Republican congressional landslide. 
Both out of ideological commitment and personal loyalty, they 
backed Gringrich's first year as the confrontational speaker of 
the U.S. House. Fenno saw this as one of the costs of inexperi-
enced leaders and followers. The DeLay explanation builds upon 
this same dynamic, arguing that the Majority Whip of the U.S. 
House sought to take advantage of the 26 new Republican mem-
bers of the Texas House, pressuring them to take up the redis-
tricting fight. 
The relationship between Speaker Craddick's leadership team 
and the freshmen in the House was a symbiotic one. "The leader-
ship took care of the freshmen." 6 But few freshmen Republicans 
gave Craddick or lobbyists credit for their election. The fresh-
men insisted that they wanted to win and they got into the House 
themselves. One journalist and some veteran Democrats in the 
House saw the freshmen Republicans as anxious about their re-
election prospects in future primaries. These respondents be-
lieved that there were unspoken threats that if freshmen did not 
toe the line and vote with the Speaker, they would face well-
funded challengers in the next Republican primary.7 Because of 
gerrymandering, two-thirds of House incumbents routinely face 
little or no electoral competition after the primary.8 
Freshmen Republicans, Speaker Craddick, and other observ-
ers disagreed. Freshmen respondents unanimously said that abid-
ing by their campaign promises was a primary factor influencing 
their conduct as legislators and their votes. Representative Dan 
Branch, himself a freshman Republican, offered the clearest ex-
• Interview with Representative Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville), July 3, 2003. 
1 Interview with Harvey Kronberg, publisher and editor, Quorum Report, July 12, 2003 . 
K Niemi and Winsky ( 1987); Carey , Niemi , and Powell (2003) ; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 
(1991); Rhodes (2000, 88); Hamm and Moncrief(2004, 165). 
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planation of the freshmen's relationship with the Speaker. 
Freshmen Republicans "had a close relationship with the 
Speaker; it was also his freshman year as Speaker." The fresh-
men's votes were responsible for putting the Speaker into office. 
"He owes this speakership to us." It was also true that many 
freshmen owed their campaigns to Craddick. He had helped 
them with their elections. Craddick identified candidates with the 
same political ideologies, they pledged to be on his team, and in 
return he helped them with their election. But they had repaid 
that debt by pledging to support his election . The strongest bond 
they shared was the same political base. This ideological and 
political bond tied the freshmen to the Speaker, even at times 
when more veteran Republican legislators were "skipping out" 
on tough votes.9 
Other legislators and observers agreed. The freshmen Repub-
licans were a "like-minded recalcitrant group of individuals" 
who were not "paying off loyalties." 10 "We" shared values and 
core beliefs; a common "like-mindedness." The Speaker would 
explain why the freshmen should support a bill but cautioned 
them, "You should represent your people." 11 Representative 
Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville) explains Craddick's role as 
more of a mentor. He was there to answer questions and help 
candidates find contacts to raise money for their campaign. 12 
Shared campaign promises and ideological beliefs forged the 
bonds between the Speaker and his freshmen Republican follow-
ers. 
The same respondents also asserted that their ideological 
commitments were key. Reelection anxieties were less important 
• Interview with Representative Dan Branch (R-Dallas), July 8, 2003 . 
'
0 Interviews with Wayne Slater, Austin bureau chief , Dallas Morning News, July 12, 
2003 ; John Pojman , Director , Texas Alliance for Life, June 19, 2003. 
11 Interview with Representative Larry Phillips (R-Sherman), July 2, 2003. 
12 Interview with Representative Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville) , July 3, 2003. 
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than their perceived obligation to stand by the commitments they 
made in the last election. There was bloc voting, but the voting 
was a strategy expressive of common values and the desire to 
have impact as an "effective voting bloc." 13 Representative 
Branch explained that freshmen constituted one third of the 
House Republicans and had the ability to swing the vote any way 
they wanted. Representative Krusee observed that there was a 
conscious decision by the freshmen to act together to have lever-
age on policy. He also noted that freshmen may have been more 
attentive to campaign promises because they knew they had not 
cultivated incumbency advantage. 14 Additionally, it is normal for 
freshmen legislators, regardless of party affiliation or govern-
mental level, to be more ideological and more partisan in their 
voting behavior. 15 
The freshman Republicans came to the Texas House moved 
more by a common agenda than bonded by a common loyalty to 
the new Speaker. Their agenda captured the essence of the main-
stream of the Texas Republican Party. It was not a Texan version 
of the "Contract with America" but a set of legislative initiatives 
that had won some partial victories in earlier sessions. 
The Meaning of Changes in Rules, Norms, and Procedures 
The 2003 regular session of the Texas House began with a 
number of significant rule and procedural changes. More impor-
tant were changes in how rules were interpreted and applied. 
Representative Jerry Madden (R-Plano) stressed that while these 
changes in content and interpretation were important, the first 
year of Laney's speakership in 1993 was when most of the sig-
nificant rule changes took place. 16 Representative Pete Laney 
13 Interview with Branch . 
14 Interview with Krusee. 
,s Jenkins (2002); Snyder and Groseclose (2000); Kingdon ( 1989, 81, 114). 
16 Interview with Representative Jerry Madden (R-Plano), July 1, 2003. 
THE JOURNAL or POLJTI CAL SCIENCE 
LEARNING TO GOVERN 17 
insisted, "I don't think we saw many changes in the House rules. 
I think we saw many changes in the interpretation of the House 
rules." 17 
An ad hoc committee of House members 18 proposed aban-
doning "substantial compliance." The substantial compliance 
rule gave the Speaker the power to override points of orders on 
technicalities, such as grammatical errors in a bill, that would 
delay the process of the bill by sending it back to committee for 
revision. The committee also recommended abandoning the sen-
iority rule for appointments to the powerful Appropriations 
Committee. The House passed both rule changes. 
The ad hoc committee's motives for abandoning substantial 
compliance are clear. Speaker Craddick wanted it gone and so 
did the House Democrats. The effect of the removal is less clear. 
The rule change was intended to "empower the rninority." 19 
Moreover, the change returned the House to its traditional prac-
tice, a practice that had been abandoned when the rule was first 
implemented in 1999. Its practical effects are less clear. House 
Parliamentarian Steve Collins felt that the Speaker's power to 
deny points of order over minor mistakes is "implied in the [ex-
isting House] rules." 20 Others argued that the change narrowed 
the Speaker's discretion and "empowered" the minority "to de-
lay and disrupt" through frequent points of order, a tool that 
would be valuable for the minority but something the Republi-
cans could not use effectively in previous sessions because of the 
substantial compliance rule.2' Table 1 demonstrates that the re-
verse actually happened. While the number of points of order 
17 Interview with Laney. 
IK Accounts conflict whether it was staffed with supporters of the Speaker or open to any 
member of the House. 
1
• Interview with Steven Rains , Office of the Governor, June 18, 2003 . 
20 Interview with Steve Collins , House Parliamentarian, June 12, 2003. 
21 Interview with Krusee. 
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increased over the past three regular sessions, the percentage sus-
tained dropped. The rule change seemed to empower the 
Speaker, not the minority. 
Table 1* 
Points of Order 
Regum 7(/' nt' 7ft' 
SeHort January 12- January 9- January 14-May 3 1, 1999 May 28. 200 1 June 2, 2003 
11 % 11 % n % 
PoinlsofQw- 31 71 85 
Suslam:I 13 42% 27 38% 28 33% 
WrtWrawn JO 32% 22 31% 21 25% 
Over-Ruled 8 26% 22 31% 36 42% 
*Table I is constructed on data from the 2003 House Jrumal available lhrough the Texas Legislative 
Coorx:il. 'Texas Legislature Online," http:/www.capitolstate.tx.us/. 
Republican and Democratic legislators agreed that there were 
a higher number of points of order; they differed over the mo-
tives for raising such points . The biggest increase in points of 
order occurred between the 76th and the 77th sessions, an indica-
tion of the increasingly partisan nature of House debates during 
the 77th session. The percentage over-ruled also increased sub-
stantially. Our 2003 interviews found that Republican legislators, 
staffers from both parties, and non-legislative observers saw the 
frequent points of order made during the regular session as a tac-
tic to obstruct debate, not to develop good policy. Democratic 
legislators disagreed (Table 2). Our 2004 interviews reflected a 
similar breakdown, although either fading or more temperate 
memories prompted a milder partisan division among our re-
spondents. 
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Laney in 1993.24 The previous rule guaranteed senior members 
of the House half of the seats on the committee if they wanted 
them. The new rule eliminated seniority as a criterion. The 
Speaker now chooses all the members. Legislators of both par-
ties and their staff characterized the change as one increasing the 
Speaker 's power while undercutting Democratic influence. 
Table3 




Speaker 's Did Not Speaker's Did Not 
Power Powe.r 
Republican Legislators and 
Staffers 
Democratic Legislators and 
Staffers 
7 1 (n = 5) 29 (n = 2) 
JOO (n = 5) 0 
*Note: No staffers were intervi ewed for the 2004 sample. 
80 (n = 4) 
100 (n = 
14) 
20 (n = I) 
0 
The impact of this change was immediate . Several senior lib-
eral Democrat s no longer found seats on the committee. The in-
direct effects are more ambiguous. The rule change either took 
away institutional memory from the Democratic left and weak-
ened advocacy for old policies ,25or got rid of individuals who 
had "become experts at generating funds for their thing."26 Most 
agreed that the change made the Appropriations Committee chair 
stronger since committee members knew less about procedures 
and budget processes . Others point out that the previous ses-
sion 's Appropriation Committee chair held a tighter rein on the 
committee than did Representative Talmadge Heflin , the chair 
24 lnterview with Collins. 
'-' Interview with Kronberg. 
26 Interview with Madden. 
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Table2 




Used No Effort Used No Effort 
to to to to 
Obstruct Obstruct Obstruct Obstruct 
Republican Legislators 73 (n = 8) 27 (n = 3) 80 (n =4) 20 (n = I) 
and Staffers 
Democratic Legislators 33 (n = I) 67 (n = 2) 50(n=4) 50 (n = 7) 
Non-Leeislative Observers IOO(n=4 ) 0 
*Note : No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele. 
Speaker Craddick increased the number of standing commit -
tees by four to a total of thirty-seven . Parliamentarian Steve 
Collins pointed out that it is rare for a Speaker to create new 
committees in his first term. Speakers usually cut back on com-
mittees in their first sessions and then expand in later sessions. 22 
The increase in committees caused problems for Republicans 
because the rule permitting members no more than two substan-
tive committee assignments meant that each committee had a 
smaller membership. The change also meant that new and there-
fore less experienced Republican members chaired more com-
mittees, weakening the accumulated expertise that older, usually 
Democratic, chairs had possessed. It also both strengthens and 
weakens the Speaker's power. He has more plums such as chair 
positions to award supporters but also must coordinate a larger 
number of committees. 23 
Speaker Craddick and the ad hoc rules committee centralized 
power in the House Appropriations Committee by changing the 
seniority rule established by Democratic House Speaker Pete 
22 Interview with Collins . 
23 Interview with Steven Rains, Office of the Governor , June 18, 2003 . 
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during the 78th session. 27 Journalist Harvey Kronberg (2002) saw 
the first real evidence of a decline in civility in the House when 
Republican legislators began to talk about revising the seniority 
rule for the Appropriations Committee. The demotion of so many 
senior Democrats from one of the most powerful House commit-
tee was seen, according to Kronberg, as one of the first signifi-
cant breaks with bipartisan norms. 
It was clear that the breakdown of civility and bipartisanship 
did begin early in the House session despite Speaker Craddick's 
apparent efforts to create a bipartisan process . There was evi-
dence at the beginning of the 2003 regular session that the House 
would continue to be partially bipartisan. Speaker Craddick as-
sured members that, "While partisan issues may arise from time 
to time, legislative actions, and certainly legislative leadership , 
must be truly bipartisan" (quoted in Quorum Report, 2003a). His 
declaration was followed by a series of conflicting actions test-
ing the new Speaker's commitment to bipartisanship. Three days 
after his announcement, the House voted to strengthen the 
Speaker by allowing him to appoint all the members of the Ap-
propriations Committee. Senior Democrats were denied seats on 
this key committee that would have been theirs under the old 
seniority rule . On the other hand, Speaker Craddick released the 
committee assignments for the new session on January 30, ap-
pointing sixteen Democrats to committee chairs. The percentage 
of Democratic chairs equaled the percentage of seats Democrats 
held in the new House. Under the previous speaker, Democrat 
Pete Laney, Republicans held only one-third of these leadership 
positions, significantly less than the forty-eight percent of the 
seats they held in the House. Nonetheless, few of these Democrat 
chairs held significant power. For example, Representative Ron 
Wilson, an African-American Democrat from Houston, was ap-
27 [nlerview with Rains. 
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pointed chair of the Ways and Means Commjttee, normally one 
of the most influential committees in the House. However, the 
united Republican leadership's "no new taxes" pledge largely 
made Ways and Means irrelevant in the 2003 session. 
The chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, Jim Dun-
nam, did not give Craddkk much credit for his attempt. When 
commenting on Craddick's committee assignments Dunnam de-
clared, "any semblance of fairness or bipartisansrup is just a fa-
yade" (quoted in Slover, 2003). Despite the authenticity of 
Craddick's efforts or the credibility ofDunnam's allegations, it is 
evident that there was a strong tension between Republican and 
Democratic leadership from the beginning of the session. 
There were also changes in how the rules were used by mem-
bers, especially Democrats. Table 4 shows that there was a 48% 
increase in the number of motions to amend offered during the 
78th regular session as compared with the 77th . There was an 
even more dramatic 68% increase in the ratio of amendments 
offered per bill. The appropriation bill, the reorganization of 
health and human services, and the tort reform bills were each 
subjected to more amendments than any bill during the two pre-
vious sessions. Overwhelmingly, and unlike the prior two ses-
sions, motions to amend came from one party-the House 
Democrats. 
A large majority of our respondents from both years said that 
motions to amend were not used to prevent bad policy, and all 
but Democratic legislators went on to state that the intent was to 
obstruct floor debate. Minority Leader Dunnam recounted that 
Democrats were forced to offer so many amendments because 
Republicans refused to compromise before the debate came to the 
floor. They were not open to the committee process. 28 Parliamen-
28 Interview with Representative Jim Dunnam (D-Waco) , Democratic Minority Leader. 
June 30, 2003 . 
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tarian Collins reports that some amendments were "used for both 
purposes," to advance policies and to delay Republican actions.29 
Amendnms Offered 
Bills RfceivingMctkn<; toAmend 
Raioof AmromertstoBills 
Bills roceiving highest numl:x:Y 
c:i nrtirns to amro: 
SB 4 (Sdm! Rnarre) 
SB 7 (E]ectric Utility De-
Regulalioo) 
HB 1 (Awcµi.-ims) 
SB 1 (Appupialims) 
HB 2912 (N!tUral Renuces) 
SB 2 (Qwnd Wim-
~Districts) 
HBI(~) 




Motions to Amend 
January 12-
























*Table 4 is consttucted from data on House bills 300 ameoomenlS available through the Texas Legis-
lative Council, 'Texas Legislature Online," ht1p://www.C11pit0Lstate.tx.us/. 
Representative Krusee believed that Democrats hung themselves 
with the large number of amendments, undermining their credi-
bility so that no one was listening when they proposed a '"good 
faith' amendment that wasn't for obstruction." Krusee also ar-
gued that the 154 amendments proposed on HB4, the tort reform 
29 Email from Collins, dated August 19, 2004 . 
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bill, were "designed not to win on policy ... [but] on politics ."30 
Representative Branch agreed, believing that Democrats sought 
to propose amendments that would place Republicans in politi-
cally embarrassing positions at the next election . 
Table 5 
Purpose of Democrats' Motions to Amend, 2003 & 2004 
(in percents) 
2003 2004* 
Used in Not in Used in Not in 
Effort to Effort To Effort to Effort to 
Obstruct Obstruct Obstruct Obstruct 
Republican Legislators and 9 1 (n = 10) 9 (n = I ) 100 (n = 0 Staffers 5) 
Democratic Legislators and 25 (n = 2) 75 (n = 6) 29 (n = 4) 7 1 (n = Staffers 10) 
*Note: No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele. 
Observers outside the legislature such as Lisa McGiffard of 
the liberal Texas Consumers Union agreed with Krusee .31 Long 
time House watcher and journalist Harvey Kronberg (2003) 
wrote that the Democrats ' choice to submit hundreds of amend-
ments in an effort to delay major bills proposed by Republicans 
was an unprecedented use of the House rules. In response many 
Republican s defied norms by bloc voting against all Democrat 
amendrnents. 32 This included serious amendments proposed by 
Democrat s. Republican s became frustrated with the Democrats ' 
attempts to obstruct legislation, as opposed to working to build 
compromise and comity between the two parties . As a result they 
30 Interview with Krusee. 
31 Interview with Lisa McGiffard , policy analyst, Texas Consumers Union, June 13, 
2003 . 
32 Bloc voting did occur, but it was neither universal nor so lely Republican. Democra tic 
amendments to the tort reform bi II lost by votes ranging from 82 to I 02. 
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no longer recognized genuine attempts by Democrats to work 
within the process. 
All parties seemed to lose credibility because of the onslaught 
of amendments. Speaker Craddick's inability to control the floor 
made him seem weak even to fellow Republicans. Democrats ' 
tactics of delay through amendments hurt the chances of the 
good ones they did propose. Republicans ' frustrated reaction to 
the sheer volume of amendments made them act intransigent 
when the Democrats offered good amendments. No one won. 
The Texas House does not record floor votes unless there is 
an appeal from the members. The call for recorded floor votes 
rose during the 2003 session. Strong majorities of Republican 
respondent groups and a bare majority of 2003 Democratic legis-
lators and staffers emphasized that the call for recorded votes 
was a device to politically embarrass their opponents or to dem-
onstrate their efforts on their constituents' behalf. Few saw it as a 
straightforward device to document important votes. The use of 
recorded votes had not changed significantly from previous ses-
sions. It has always been of "tactical use ... for campaigns." 33 It is 
the frequency of its use that changed. 
Quorum calls were generally not used to obstruct. However , 
the "quorum bust" conducted by 58 of the 62 Democrats in order 
to prevent debate and vote on a pending redistricting bill tainted 
responses to this issue. The quorum bust of Monday, May 17, 
2003, was the first time that a group of House members had ever 
shut down debate by preventing a quorum. By this time both 
sides noted that there was little respect for each other, and that 
civility had markedly declined on the floor and in the committee 
hearing rooms. Political antagonism was morphing into personal 
assaults. Antagonistic cooperation had disappeared . 
JJ Interv iew with Madden . 
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There is some evidence to support the "DeLay" explanation 
in the quorum bust. The so-called "Killer Ds," the quorum bust-
ing Democrats, asserted in their official statement for their ab-
sence that, "We did not choose our path. Tom Delay [sic] did it." 
They charged that the redistricting proposal was "a power grab 
by Tom DeLay, pure and simple." This "outrageous partisan ac-
tion" forced them to flee to Oklahoma (Quorum Report, 2003b). 
Minority Leader Jim Dunnam insisted that Speaker Craddick's 
refusal to take redistricting off the table "tells us that Tom DeLay 
is in charge" (quoted in Quorum Report, 2003d). 
Table 6 
Call for Recorded Floor Votes, 2003 & 2004 
(in percents) 
2003 2004* 
Used for Not Used Used for Not Used 
Future for Future Future for Futu re 
Electoral Electoral Electoral Electoral 
Advantaee Advantaee Advantaee Advantaee 
Republican Legislators 88 (n = 7) 12 (n = I) 80(n=4) 20(n= I) 
and Staffers 
Democratic Legislators 50 (n = 2) 50 (n = 2) 79(n=II) 21 (n = 3) 
and Staffers 
*Note: No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele. 
The unique character of this issue may be more important 
than the presence or absence of Congressman Tom DeLay. De-
mocrats felt compelled to make this drastic choice because of the 
special salience of redistricting. Normally, one member's victory 
in a legislature is not another member's defeat when appraised in 
terms of electoral advantage. Indeed, a legislative defeat can be 
used by a member running for re-election to mobilize support for 
the member. However, redistricting can be a zero-sum game, 
even when the fates at stake are members of your party's con-
gressional rather than state House delegation. The Democrats 
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recognized this. The Democrats in Oklahoma wrote a letter ap-
pealing to Speaker Craddick to take redistricting off the table. 
They reassured the Speaker that "we are willing to give you our 
word ... that we will not break quorum on other issues-even 
when we disagree." 34 Congressional redistricting posed a unique 
threat to Democratic interests and evoked a unique Democratic 
response. 
The tone of the House changed for the better after the quorum 
bust. 35 Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine) said that there 
was "no effort to be bipartisan until we returned ... [Speaker 
Craddick] thought we were irrelevant until this point." 36 Redis-
tricting did not come up again until the special sessions during 
the summer. 
Speaker Craddick sought to maintain earlier norms of biparti-
sanship by refusing to recognize Republican motions to suspend 
the rules in order to consider bills that died due to deadlines ex-
piring during the quorum bust. Such a suspension would have 
been unprecedented. Republican legislators had pressed Speaker 
Craddick to retaliate by jamming redistricting down the throats 
of Democrats. Speaker Craddick told a closed meeting of the 
Republican Caucus that there would be no retribution. Represen-
tative Krusee recounted, "The caucus supported him without res-
ervation, if not without heartache" (quoted in Copelin, 2003). No 
doubt the Speaker also recognized that few Democrats would 
vote for suspending the rules, a motion requiring a two-thirds 
vote. 
34 Quorum Report (2003c) . The lone House member of either party to vote against Crad-
dick ' s' election as Speaker saw it differently . ''The idea of walking out on Craddick and 
Texas Republicans had been brewing for two months . ' It was only a question of when, 
and over what issue, "' Representative Lon Burnam (D-Ft Worth) said . Quoted in Ken-
nedy (2003) . 
35 Interview with Kronberg . 
36 Interview with Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine) , July 9, 2003. 
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Representative Laney pointed out one significant change in 
norms: 
I never voted on a bill, maybe two or so times, in my whole 
career as Speaker and other than that it was always to break 
a tie. But Craddick voted many times. And he would do this 
before members would vote, 'signaling' to them how they 
should vote.37 
This was a significant change, although there is anecdotal evi-
dence to suggest that prior speakers were more involved than 
Laney had been in the voting process. Nonetheless, Speaker 
Craddick was not afraid to vote and to vote early. The change 
may be reflective of personal style or institutional commitment. 
As likely, and more generously, the change may be reflective of 
the two different roles each speaker played. Laney was a speaker 
presiding over a political and ideological status quo that he sup-
ported. Craddick was a speaker trying to challenge the status 
quo. Laney presumed a consensus that had evaporated as Texas 
and the House membership changed. 
Conclusion 
The consequences of changes in rules, norms, and procedures 
were evident. Most respondents areed that there was less com-
promise and more confrontation. 3 Speaker Craddick remarked, 
"rules usually only take one hour to pass and this year they took 
a whole day. "39 "The process of negotiation and compro-
mise ... were missing this session on the floor," Representative 
Gallego observed.40 While there are conflicting accounts identi-
fying the precise culprits, there is no doubt some truth to indi-
37 Interview with Laney. 
38 Interview with Speaker Pro Tern Sylvester Turner (D-Houston), July 25, 2003 . 
39 Interview with House Speaker Tom Craddick, June 26, 2003. 
40 Interview with Gallego . 
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vidual explanations for increased partisanship . But broader ex-
planations are more helpful. 
The "Tom DeLay Did It" explanation is plainly applicable to 
the legislative struggle over redistricting. However, while most 
respondents agree that strong-arm partisan politics was the order 
of the day on redistricting, we found little evidence to suggest 
that this explanation explains the 2003 regular House session. 
Partisanship developed early in the session before redistricting 
became a contentious issue. DeLay may have simply tapped into 
a tension already well developed in the House. The redistricting 
explosion came from the developing tension. It did not alone 
cause the tension . 
Undoubtedly , Speaker Craddick and the House Republican 
majority had much to learn. Speaker Craddick displayed a nota-
ble lack of finesse. Previous speakers would permit amendments 
they did not like and just drop them in conference committee .41 
The "growing pains" that all new leaders experience explained 
some of the Speaker's problems . A more seasoned speaker would 
have done more work on forging agreements before an issue 
went to the floor. Not doing so made the Speaker and the Repub-
licans appear inflexible and ideologically intolerant. 42 One re-
spondent noted the chaotic referral of bills to committee with no 
apparent reason as a prime example of inexperience. 43 The fact 
that bills can be assigned to a variety of different committees 
because of the overlapping jurisdiction of these committees 
grants great power to the Speaker. The Speaker's over-ruling of 
points of order was labeled "haphazard. He should have been 
[sic] done more carefully." 44 Speaker Craddick was also criti-
41 Interview with Kronberg . 
'
2 Interview with Slater . 
43 Interview with McGiffard . 
44 Interview with Madden . 
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cized because he let Democrats propose and debate too many 
frivolous amendments, making him appear not to be in control. 
Every new Speaker has to learn how to run the House. Sym-
pathizers invoked phrases such as "learning curve," 45 a "learning 
process" 46 and the expectation that the Speaker's style would 
change as he learned how to get things done. One legislator de-
murred. The legislative chaos was "not due to lack of experi-
ence." Representative Laney opined, it was "just the way he ran 
the House, his style." 47 
There is a curious twist in applying Fenno to the 2003 regular 
Texas House session. While Fenno recognized the impact of an 
inexperienced minority, his greatest emphasis was on the signifi-
cance of an inexperienced majority. We find that the inexperi-
ence of the new minority in the Texas House was as important as 
the majority's. The new Speaker did have to learn how to meld 
his personal style, his party's agenda, and institutional demands, 
but Speaker Craddick's learning curve was no steeper than new 
speakers before him. 
Fenno's explanation offers more insight into the problems ex-
perienced by the Democratic minority than the difficulties con-
fronted by the Republican majority in the 2003 Texas House. He 
properly points out that assuming the role of a majority after be-
ing out of power for a long time can be crippling. But learning to 
be the majority may be easier than learning to be the minority 
after being in power for 130 years. The majority can learn practi-
cal skills, such as how to run a floor debate. Some individual 
legislators, Democrats and Republicans, sought to be "institu-
tional partisans," especially the handful of Democrats, infor-
mally called "Craddick D's," whom the Speaker had appointed 
45 Interview with Rains . 
46 Interview with Madden. 
•
1 Interview with Laney. 
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to key leadership positions. But losing power is more difficult. 
"When you lose power you lose influence," 48 and that is a blow 
difficult to accept. Clearly, both the majority and the minority 
party leaders adopted the "confrontational partisanship" Fenno 
identified in the U.S. House in 1995. 
The role reversal imposed on Republicans and Democrats had 
a demonstrable effect on the 2003 regular session. Representa-
tive Arlene Wohlgemuth CR-Burleson) expressed the Republi-
cans' conviction that it is the minority's job to compromise with 
the majority.49 Republicans had to bend left to accommodate the 
Democratic majority in earlier sessions. Now the Democrats, 
Republicans said, must bend right to accommodate the new ma-
jority. The Democrats had to "learn to lose"50 but "they lacked 
the skills to be in the minority."51 Not surprisingly, the Democ-
rats did not see it that way. Representative Scott Hochberg (D-
Houston) asserted that the Democrats sought to find ways to win 
within the system "but the only way to be effective was to work 
against it. "52 
The group struggling most with its new role was the House 
Democrats. The Democrats were divided. They could not decide 
on one issue to push until congressional redistricting came on the 
table. They also struggled to grasp that, when you are in the mi-
nority, learning to compromise is essential to governing . When 
compromises must come from the weakened status of being a 
new minority, it is hard to accept. The Republicans found it diffi-
cult to learn to govern as a responsible majority. The Democrats 
48 lnterview with John Colyandro, Director, Texas Conservative Coalition , June 30, 2003 . 
" lnterview with Wohlgemuth . 
50 lnterview with Phillips . 
51 interview with Madden. 
52 Telephone interview with Representative Scott Hochberg (D-Houston), August 4, 
2003 . 
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had the challenging task of learning to constructively oppose the 
majority in their role as the responsible minority. 
The national trend toward increasing party competition for 
state legislatures, accompanied by increasing partisan conflict 
within state legislatures, has shifted members' concerns away 
from the needs of the legislature as an institution to the specific 
electoral and policy objectives of the party. In recent years the 
Texas House has experienced this shift to a more election-
oriented institution. Legislative party leaders in many states are 
becoming preoccupied with campaigns and elections. This had 
not been true for former Democratic speakers such as Pete 
Laney. When you are the majority party for over 100 years there 
is no apparent need to focus on electoral outcomes. But for a 
long-suffering minority it is important that its leaders help facili-
tate campaign finances and focus on building the legislative 
party. For years Craddick sought to build a Republican majority 
in the Texas House. His success in 2003 strained civility in the 
House. Electoral competition forced the handover of control 
from Democrats to Republicans. Electoral stakes undermined 
institutional loyalty and cross-party comity. 
The Texas House experienced a tumultuous session for a va-
riety of reasons: the budget crunch, the redistricting debacle, an 
inexperienced majority and minority, the leadership style of the 
new Speaker, and the inevitable tensions of a legislative session. 
But the Texas House was also subject to forces far more typical 
of contemporary state legislatures: increasing partisanship, de-
clining civility, the impact of electoral calculations, and deinsti-
tutionalization. State legislators now value the incentives to 
ensure a stable institution less than they value the incentives 
posed by partisan electoral and policy considerations. The legis-
lature's environment penetrates its walls in ways that we have 
not witnessed recently. This may lessen the legislature's capacity 
to make bipartisan policy, but it also demonstrates the legisla-
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ture's openness to the society it helps to govern. The tradeoffs 
between open and effective government are not new. It is, after 
all, the dilemma of a legislature in a liberal democracy: how to 
be representative of a society's diversity and concerns while re-
maining sufficiently organized to legislate effectively for that 
society. The 2003 Texas House was no more able than any legis-
lature to fully resolve this dilemma . 
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